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TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES’ ABILITY TO
SUSTAIN SUCCESS AMID GROWING REGULATORY CONCERNS
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Molly Parato*

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are in a new city, or are enjoying a night out on the
town. It is late, and you need to find a way home. As you walk out onto
the street, what do you see? I would guess you see an empty street, with
maybe a car or two passing by as you stand there idly. As you try to figure
out how to get home, you must first consider your options. There is always
public transit, such as the bus or subway. But for some, especially after a
night of drinking, walking several blocks to the nearest bus stop or subway
station is not the safest option. Another option is a taxicab. Although you
may not see any waiting outside the bar, you can always call a dispatcher
and have one sent to you. But that could take who knows how long. And,
*
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if you have just walked out of a bar that is now closed, your only option is
to wait for the taxi outside.
Another option is getting a “transportation network company” to
pick you up. While you are still in the bar, you can just slip out your
smartphone, send your address, and by the time you walk outside, your
ride is waiting for you. You also have the added security that your ride
will actually show up because you can watch it progress toward your pickup spot in real time. And you know that this is your ride as opposed to
another bar-goer’s ride because you were given your driver’s name and
license plate ahead of time. This seems like the most obvious choice when
you consider the disadvantages offered by the other options. There is
speed, convenience, and a security that your ride will come when it says it
will. Plus, if you are a frequent user of this transportation method, you
likely did not even have to take out money because you have a credit card
stored in your phone that automatically paid the travel fare.
These new on-demand transportation services, often referred to as
Transportation Network Companies (“TNCs”), have greatly altered the
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transportation industry.1 Today, there are several companies that utilize
this on-demand transportation throughout the United States and globally.
Transportation experts refer to the services offered by TNCs as
“ridesourcing,”2 a concept that should be distinguished from the term
“ridesharing.”3 Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), a multinational
organization that operates a mobile phone software application (“app”)
used to connect passengers to drivers,4 is the largest and so far the most
successful of the on-demand transportation companies.5 Uber’s main
competitor and the next largest on-demand transportation service, Lyft,
Inc. (“Lyft”), utilizes a similar business model to Uber that matches local
drivers with riders.6
Companies like Uber and Lyft have irreparably disrupted the
taxicab industry, but as the law catches up with these new TNCs, the
1

Lisa Rayle, et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and
Ridesourcing Trips and User Characteristics in San Francisco, UNIV. OF CAL.
TRANSPORTATION CENTER (2014) 1
http://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/Dec2014/RidesourcingWhitePaper_Nov2014.pdf.
2
Id.
3
Id. “Ridesharing” occurs when the driver and rider are going to the same or nearby
destinations, whereas “ridesourcing” drivers are transporting the rider to a destination. Id.
4
Id.
5
Jennifer J. Kunz, Transportation Network Companies (e.g. Uber, Lyft, etc.), BEST BEST
& KRIEGER, https://www.bbklaw.com/getmedia/e82420f3-cc71-4da2-b13148235e608dbf/WONK-Breakfast-TNCs (last visited June 19, 2017).
6
Id.
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companies will have to take into consideration the extensive legal fees
required in order to either fight or reshape transportation regulations. This
is most evident for Uber, the largest TNC, which is currently facing more
litigation than any other startup in the world.7
Uber has a launch first, deal with logistics later approach.8 Uber
generally enters a new city and then confronts the regulatory concerns
after it has established a presence in that city.9 Once consumers form a
reliance on the services that Uber offers, it is harder for local governments
to exert leverage against Uber.10 This model generally works for Uber;
however, when it is unsuccessful, Uber faces high regulatory barriers that
usually lead to costly settlements.11
Although Uber is one of the most successful businesses of its time,
it faces numerous challenges to its sustainability over the long run because

7

Kristen Brown, Uber is Facing a Staggering Number of Lawsuits, FUSION (Jan. 25,
2016, 7:00 AM), http://fusion.net/story/257423/everyone-is-suing-uber/.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
This is most apparent in Uber and Lyft’s campaign to change an Austin, Texas
ordinance, where it is estimated the companies spent $8.6 million on the campaign. Nolan
Hicks & Ben Wear, Prop. 1 goes down as Activist Proclaims: ‘Austin made Uber an
Example’, MY STATESMAN (May 7, 2016, 5:52 PM)
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/election-day-voting-lightso-far-on-austins-prop-1/nrJmG/.
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of the great number of lawsuits it is involved in. Much of Uber’s future
will be left to the courts, which is generally not where regulation should be
decided. This is because Uber is a national firm, but different judges may
apply different laws depending upon the jurisdiction in which the suit was
brought. This would lead to inconsistent rules and a mess for anyone
hoping to hop on the TNC bandwagon.
Uber in many respects eliminates the need for the regulations that
have plagued the traditional taxicab industry for the past several decades.
However, there are certain aspects of Uber, and all TNCs, that need to be
determined by a regulatory body in order for TNCs to continue their
growth.12 Although Uber, as well as other TNCs, faces great costs due to
litigation over a wide range of issues, Uber will be able to sustain its
growth while also funding its litigation expenses because of the lasting
effect Uber has had on the market.
This paper will first examine the pricing strategies of TNCs and
how their entrance into the market has affected the taxicab industry. This

12

Specifically, there needs to be a decision regarding the status of TNC drivers. Whether
they are classified as employees or independent contractors will determine much of the
current litigation against Uber.
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paper will then discuss Uber specifically to determine whether the larger
litigation costs will impede Uber’s ability to continue growing over time.
II. WHAT ARE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES?
A Transportation Network Company (“TNC”) uses smartphone
apps to connect potential passengers to drivers who offer rides in their
own personal vehicles.13 In 2013, the California Public Utilities
Commission defined a TNC as an organization “that provides prearranged
transportation services for compensation using an online-enabled
application (app) or platform to connect passengers with drivers using
their personal vehicles.”14
Uber, originally founded as UberCab in March of 2009, 15 was the
first of its kind, offering a respite from the frustration of trying to find a

13

Rayle, supra note 1, at 2.
Commissioner Peavey, Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public
Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry, CAL. PUBL. UTIL.
COMM’N, 3 (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K112/77112285.PDF.
15
Nathan McAlone, Here’s how Uber got its start and grew to become the most valuable
startup in the world, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2015, 8:00 AM)
http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-uber-and-its-rise-to-become-the-mostvaluable-startup-in-the-world-2015-9/#september-2015-ubers-china-arm-raises-12billion-to-aid-in-its-fight-in-the-china-market-ubers-biggest-competitor-didi-kuaidiresponds-by-raising-about-3-billion-26.
14
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cab during peak travel hours or dealing with the expense of a car service. 16
The service was priced between a typical cab fare and a car service fee,17
but the main attraction was the better quality service and higher end
vehicles used for transportation.18 This original service is the equivalent to
today’s UberBLACK.19 By 2010, UberCab went live for the first time in
the San Francisco Bay Area20 and changed its name to just “Uber.”21
Shortly after, Uber began its national expansion and later began expanding
on an international scale in 2011.22
When it launched in San Francisco in 2010,23 Uber originally
offered only one service, UberBLACK.24 But Uber has since expanded its
offered services to include other transportation classifications at varied

16

Leena Rao, UberCab Takes the Hassle Out of Booking A Car Service, TECHCRUNCH
(July 5, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/07/05/ubercab-takes-the-hassle-out-ofbooking-a-car-service/.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. UberBLACK is discussed infra Part IV.
20
McAlone, supra note 15.
21
Id.
22
Avery Hartmans & Nathan McAlone, The Story of how Travis Kalanick Built Uber
into the most Feared and Valuable Startup in the World, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 1,
2016, 11:30 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-history/#june-1998-scour-apeer-to-peer-search-engine-startup-that-kalanick-had-dropped-out-of-ucla-to-join-snagsits-first-investment-from-former-disney-president-michael-ovitz-and-ron-burkle-ofyucaipa-companies-1.
23
McAlone, supra note 15.
24
Id.
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prices as well as services beyond transportation, such as food delivery.25 It
also currently offers ride-sharing services in San Francisco.26
Uber has subsequently added more services.27 In late 2012, Uber
announced UberX, a cheaper alternative to UberBLACK that allows
drivers to use their own vehicles.28 By 2014, Uber began testing a new
courier service called UberRUSH in Manhattan,29 and it added
UberPOOL, a service available only in a few cities.30
Uber has been the subject of several lawsuits from drivers, taxi
companies, and governments on a global scale. Currently, Uber is
involved in over 50 lawsuits around the world.31

25

See Eric Auchard, Uber Launches Global Assault on Takeaway Meals Market,
REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2016, 7:22 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-food-deliveryidUSKCN11W2LX; Joshua Brustein, Uber Expands Into Courier Service With
Manhattan-Only Pilot, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 7, 2014, 4:56 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-07/with-uber-rush-the-car-servicetests-manhattan-only-courier-service.
26
UberPOOL San Francisco: Everybody’s In!, UBER NEWSROOM (Sept. 2, 2014),
https://newsroom.uber.com/us-california/uberpool-san-francisco-everybodys-in/.
27
John P. Pullen, Everything You Need to Know About Uber, TIME (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://time.com/3556741/uber/.
28
Id.
29
Brustein, supra note 25.
30
See UBER, Ride with Uber, https://www.uber.com/ride/ (last visited June 19, 2017);
Jenn Harris, Uber Launches $3 Food Delivery Service UberFresh, LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://www.latimes.com/food/dailydish/la-dd-uber-launchesfood-delivery-service-uberfresh-20141208-story.html.
31
Brown, supra note 7.
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III. THE TAXICAB INDUSTRY PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF TNC’S
The taxicab industry has historically been a monopoly with
extremely high barriers to entry due to the need for medallions, essentially
a license to own a taxi, in order to operate a taxi. Ridesourcing services,
such as the on-demand transportation services offered by companies like
Uber and Lyft, have become a subset of the taxicab and limousine
industry.32 With industry revenue anticipated to grow to $18.9 billion by
2016,33 the taxicab industry is an appealing marketplace for ridesourcing
firms that are able to gain entry. With that, however, taxicab operators are
incentivized to delay disruption to the market.
The taxicab industry is highly regulated by local governments
restricting entry into the markets, fares, and services. 34 The taxicab
industry is so highly regulated because there is a need for the regulation.
Proponents of taxicab regulation argue that the market imperfections may
create market failures or lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in

32

Brian Sayler, Taxi & Limousine Services in the US, IBISWORLD (Jan. 2017),
http://clients1.ibisworld.com/reports/us/industry/default.aspx?entid=1951.
33
Brian Sayler, Industry at a Glance, IBISWORLD (Jan. 2017),
http://clients1.ibisworld.com/reports/us/industry/ataglance.aspx?entid=1951.
34
Mark W. Frankena & Paul A. Pautler, An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation, 1
(F.T.C. 1984).
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certain segments.35 Aspects of the taxi industry that contribute to the
efficiency, or lack thereof, of the market include wait-time, cost, and
consumer welfare.36 The potential inefficient resource allocations include
“over- or under-production of various taxicab services, production of
service at too low a quality level, or unnecessarily high costs of producing
a given output.”37 There are several areas of regulation to protect against
these market failures such as price controls, restrictions on entry, and
regulations

on

quality,

“which

concern

vehicle

safety,

driver

qualifications, and liability insurance coverage.”38
Price controls are likely the most conspicuous of taxicab industry
regulations because they affect both consumers and drivers. There are
situations in which price regulation may be necessary in an unregulated
market because of inefficiently high fares.39 However, fare regulation in
35

Id. at 1-6. Market failures are the inefficient allocation of resources. Id. A market
outcome is considered efficient only when there is no conceivable change in the
allocation of resources that would make one individual better off without harming
another individual. LYNNE PEPALL, ET AL., , INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 28 (Wiley 5th
ed. 2014). Thus, if there is some way in which to improve the position of one individual
without taking from another, then the market is not efficient. Id.
36
Sean McBride, Ridesourcing and the Taxi Marketplace (May 2015) (unpublished
Senior Honors Economic Thesis) (on file with Boston College University Libraries).
37
Frankena, supra note 34.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 3. The first situation is cruising taxis or taxis waiting at airports; the cab fare
would be inefficiently high because of the high transaction costs to consumers of finding
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itself may pose as a market imperfection because, depending on the type
of trip, the regulated price may be too low and firms would operate at a
loss.40
The justifications for restrictions on entry are based on the idea
that if fare rates are set inefficiently high for the service offered, then an
inefficiently large number of drivers will enter the market. 41 However, this
is only true if fares are too high—in which case, the argument would
support deregulation of taxi fares rather than entry regulations.42
Legislators created restrictions on entry by use of medallions. A medallion
is essentially a license to operate a taxi;43 there are only so many
medallions available in the city and few are issued each year.44 In 2013,

the cheapest taxi. Id. The second situation is cruising taxi drivers, who could potentially
charge higher rates to consumers who are unable to find another taxi. Id. The third
situation is where taxi firms could charge higher fares for radio-dispatch and contracted
cabs because of the taxi firms’ benefits from economies of scale. Id. Economies of scale
occur “[w]hen average cost falls as output increases, it means that the cost per unit of
output declines as the scale of operations rises.” Pepall, supra note 35, at 69. Economies
of scale can pose as a barrier to entry to smaller firms, thus enabling the established taxi
farms to take advantage and charge higher fares. Frankena, supra note 34, at 3.
40
Frankena, supra note 34, at 4.
41
Id. at 41.
42
Id. at 4. Entry restrictions are also argued to increase efficiency because taxis cause
congestion and pollution. Id. This argument was rejected by Frankena and Pautler based
on the evidence of congestion and pollution externalities from taxicabs. Id. at 5.
43
Id. at 26.
44
ANNA BARLETT & YESIM YILMAZ, TAXICAB MEDALLIONS - A REVIEW OF
EXPERIENCES IN OTHER CITIES, 1 (2011).
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the average sale price of a medallion in New York City was approximately
$967,000.45
A third market failure in the taxicab industry that regulations
attempt to fix is information asymmetry.46 Information asymmetry
supports regulations on quality.47 Regulations on the quality of service
regard “vehicle design, condition, age, and safety, driver qualifications,
and liability insurance coverage.”48 Before actually getting into the
taxicab, the rider cannot determine the quality he or she is about to
receive.49 It is not until the rider has already made the choice to get into
the cab that he or she could decide if the cab is clean, the vehicle is safe,

45

MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & DAVID YASSKY, 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, 12(New York
City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n 2014).
46
Information asymmetry occurs when the parties to a transaction have different levels of
information. THOMAS LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE, 168, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS
(Forthcoming 2017) (on file with author). A result of information asymmetry is underproduction of goods or services that consumers want, called the “lemons problem.” Id. at
169. Essentially, when consumers are unsure of the quality they are going to receive from
a good or service, they will only pay the average of the lowest potential value of the good
or service and the highest potential value—because there is a 50% chance they will get a
good deal, and a 50% chance they will be overpaying. Id. at 168-169. If consumers are
only paying the average, then high-quality producers are not going to sell on the market
because their good is being under-valued. Id. Then, without those high-quality products,
consumers will lower the amount they are willing to pay, because the average price of
that good has now gone down, which then results in the slightly-above-average producers
pulling out. Id. This cycle repeats itself until there are only low-quality producers left in
the market. Id.
47
Frankena, supra note 34, at 4.
48
Id. at 27-28.
49
Id. at 4.
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or even if the driver is qualified.50 Further, the rider has no way of
knowing whether the driver has liability insurance. 51 Riders would
respond to this information inequality by paying for the average valued
quality.52
Without minimum standards for service quality, drivers who would
otherwise offer high-quality services will cease offering such services
because riders, who do not know which drivers offer high or low quality
service, will only want to pay the up to the value for average services. 53
This pushes drivers offering the highest quality out of the market,
either by leaving the market altogether,54 or by lowering their quality of
service to match what they would be paid. If there are minimum fare
regulations in place, then drivers will only offer service quality to match
that fare minimum—there is no incentive for those drivers to offer highquality services.
However, considering minimum fare regulations, some consumers
may simply choose not to utilize a taxicab if they are concerned that the
50

Id.
Id.
52
LAMBERT, supra note 46, at 169.
53
Id.
54
Id.
51
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minimum fare value is above the expected quality of the taxi. Therefore, in
regards to consumer protection, regulations on quality of service may be
justified.55
Economic analysts have determined that restricting entry by use of
medallions and creating fare minimums is a waste of resources and
imposes burdens on consumers.56 However, regulations concerning
vehicle safety, insurance coverage, and requirements that fares must be
posted may be justified given the market imperfections they are trying to
correct.57
Some government agencies that create taxi regulations may not
promulgate regulations to correct overall market failures. 58 Rather, the
regulations are in place generally to protect taxi firm incumbents and
public transportation systems.59 The medallion system is an example of a
regulation that, in reality, does little more than give incumbent firms
greater market power.60 Up until the 1970s,61 the taxicab industry has seen

55

Frankena, supra note 34, at 57.
Id. at 1.
57
Id. at 37-38.
58
Id. at 6.
59
Id. at 6-7.
60
Id. at 7.
61
SCHALLER CONSULTING, THE NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB FACT BOOK, 25 (2006).
56
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little change since the creation of the medallion system in the 1930s prior
to the introduction of TNCs.62 By restricting the supply of taxicabs in the
market, the medallion system has created barriers to entry that are nearly
impossible to overcome.
The structure of the taxicab industry changed drastically when
medallion owners started leasing medallions to drivers.63 The medallion
owners provided the vehicle and insurance, as well as marketing, and the
leasing driver paid a flat fee to the medallion owner.64 Drivers could lease
a taxicab on a daily or weekly basis, and shifts lasted 12 hours.65 This new
system effectively shifted drivers from employees of the medallion
holders to independent contractors.66 The ability to lease their medallions
allowed owners “to drop employee benefits which drivers had previously
enjoyed, including health and pension benefits, employer contributions to

Medallion owners began leasing their medallions to drivers. Id.
62
BLOOMBERG & YASSKY, supra note 45, at 12. New York City responded to oversupply of taxicabs by passing the Haas Act in 1937 which established the medallion
system still used today. Id.
63
McBride, supra note 36.
64
Id. at 14.
65
Id.
66
Id.
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Social Security, scholarships, legal services, unemployment insurance and
disability insurance.”67
Taxicab drivers also saw a drop in income due to the leasing of
medallions.68 With the current leasing schemes, drivers are paid after
accounting for vehicle costs and the leasing fee, rather than commission.69
As of 2005, 57 cents for every dollar generated by fares and tips went to
drivers, 24 cents went to vehicle maintenance, 4 cents went to other
expenses, and 15 cents went to medallion owners.70
IV. HOW DID TNCS CHANGE THE MARKETPLACE?
The entry by TNCs has changed the market place—many would
argue for the better. TNCs offer a similar but still different service than
taxicabs; the biggest difference from the two is that TNCs operate via a
smartphone app. Proponents of TNCs argue that they serve previously
unmet demands for faster and convenient transportation.71 In a 2014
survey, consumers said they chose TNCs over other transportation

67

SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 61, at 27.
Id. at 36.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 35.
71
Rayle, supra note 1, at 1.
68
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services like taxicabs and public transit mostly because of convenience.72
35% of respondents said they chose a TNC for the ease of payment, and
30% said short wait time.73 Notably, only 2% said that they chose a TNC
because they could not get a taxicab.74 This indicates that consumers are
often going straight to their preferred TNC’s app rather than using a TNC
as only an alternative to taxicabs.
As the data suggests, TNCs have filled a large gap in the
marketplace because they are reaching consumers that prefer aspects such
as speed and convenience that taxicabs simply cannot offer. It is in this
way that TNCs are sustainable innovators;75 they are giving consumers
something that they want, but the new technology is better than the old
technology.76 The strategies of companies like Uber are sustainable
because they have taken an already existing service and simply made it
better in ways that respond to the flaws of the old system. 77 There are
several market failures within the taxicab industry that TNCs directly
72

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
74
Id.
75
Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 1995).
76
Id.
77
Clayton M. Christensen, et. al, What is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec.
2015).
73
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effect,78 such as information asymmetry, but there are also several
negative effects TNCs have had on various stakeholders.79
The smartphone apps create better exchanges of information
between drivers and riders by instantaneously pairing available and nearby drivers to riders in need.80 The immediate connection between drivers
and riders fixes the problems consumers face when trying to hail a cab or
when calling a dispatcher.81
Notably, Uber has obviated the need for regulations concerning
information asymmetry and the inefficiencies created therefrom by
utilizing a ranking system.82 Riders are able to provide anonymous
feedback and rate drivers on a five-star system that future riders are able to
see.83 Then, when riders request a ride via the smartphone app, in addition
to the driver’s name and photo, they can see how many stars the driver has
been given by other riders.84 Riders are given most of the information they

78

Rayle, supra note 1, at 3.
Katie Biber Chen, Disruption: Innovation vs. Incumbents, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
(Oct. 26, 2016).
80
McBride, supra note 36, at 35.
81
Id.
82
UBER, Ride with Uber, https://www.uber.com/ride/ (last visited June 19, 2017).
83
Id.
84
Id. Riders can also see the driver’s car make and model, and their license plate, as well
as how much the trip will cost and how long it will take. Id.
79
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need to make an informed decision about whether to use Uber—they
know the likely quality of service their driver will give them, and how
much the ride will cost. These are two aspects of information-related
market failures regulations are meant to protect, but they are not necessary
under Uber’s current system.
TNCs are also better able to fix many market failures of the taxicab
industry by offering different transportation options and dynamic pricing.
For example, Uber offers two classes of ride services, economy and
premium, which allow users to pick the type of car they will ride in,
economy or luxury, based on the price they are willing to pay for the
ride.85 Economy Ubers offer the lowest fares whereas Premium Ubers cost
significantly more.86
The Premium Ubers are UberBLACK, UberSUV, and UberLUX.
Premium Ubers still utilize the basic on-demand transportation system that

85

Id.
Id. The Economy Ubers are UberX, UberXL, and UberSELECT. Id. As Uber’s single
purchaser transportation service, UberX allows drivers to drive up to four passengers in
their own vehicles. Id. UberXL is essentially the same concept as UberX, but in a larger
vehicle. Id. UberXL drivers drive vans or SUVs to allow for more passengers. Id.
UberSELECT is the most expensive of the Economy Ubers because it only offers highlyrated drivers that also drive upscale sedans. Id.

86
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Uber is known for, but do so in high-end vehicles.87 This ultimately leads
to a premium paid for by the passenger.88
Uber has many other services available in select cities, such as
Uber Access and UberPOOL.89 Uber Access offers rides in handicap
accessible vehicles in certain cities.90 UberPOOL, an on-demand ridesharing service, is Uber’s lowest priced service offered. 91 This service
allows passengers to share their UberX ride and split the fare with other
Uber users who are going along the same route.92
In addition to personal transportation, Uber provides delivery
services: UberEATS and UberRUSH.93 These services share the same

87

Id.
Id. UberBLACK, the first service offered by Uber, is the lower end of the Premium
Ubers. UBER, What is UberBLACK?, https://www.uber.com/ride/uberblack/ (last visited
June 19, 2017). Like the similarity between UberX and UberXL, UberSUV offers the
same experience as UberBLACK, but with a higher capacity. See UBER, What is
UberSUV?, https://www.uber.com/ride/ubersuv/ (last visited June 19, 2017). The most
expensive of all the Uber options is UberLUX which offers professional direvers in
luxury vehicles, such as a Porsche or a Range rover. UBER, What is UberLUX?
https://www.uber.com/ride/uberlux/ (last visited June 19, 2017).
89
UBER, supra note 88.
90
Id.
91
UBER, Share your ride and save with uberPOOL, https://www.uber.com/ride/uberpool/
(last visited June 19, 2017).
92
Id.
93
UBER, Deliver With Uber, https://www.uber.com/drive/delivery/ (last visited June 19,
2017).
88
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concept as Uber’s transportation services, except that instead of
passengers these services deliver food and packages.94
These services allow Uber to appeal to a larger consumer base and
capture market share in other industries. Thus, more consumers are able to
utilize their service which benefits both the consumers and drivers who are
earning an income from these different services.
TNCs also offer different prices depending on the current demand,
called “surges.”95 Surge pricing is simply an upcharge, or increased fare,
that is calculated as a multiple of the standard fee associated with Uber’s
services conditioned on real-time demand.96 Surge pricing is based off the

94

Id. UberEATS delivers food and UberRUSH delivers packages for businesses. UBER
Introduction to Deliveries,
https://developer.uber.com/docs/deliveries/introduction (last visited June 19, 2017). In
certain cities, Uber has set up a network of local restaurants that it delivers food from.
UBER, What is UberEATS?, https://help.uber.com/h/d0a9d8d7-8066-42d7-a2664e6367158294 (last visited June 19, 2017). A user can either order an Uber to pick up
and deliver food from one of those restaurants or select from a “Instant Delivery” menu
to get food delivered in a shorter time period. Id. UberRUSH is an on-demand delivery
system that works very similar to the regular Uber services. UBER DEVELOPERS,
Introduction to Deliveries, https://developer.uber.com/docs/deliveries/introduction (last
visited June 19, 2017). Businesses can order an Uber, hand off the package to be
delivered, and then track the package as it is being delivered by the UberRUSH driver. Id.
95
McBride, supra note 36, at 48.
96
UBER, What is Surge?, https://help.uber.com/h/e9375d5e-917b-4bc5-814223b89a440eec (last visited June 19, 2017).
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rider’s location, not the driver’s.97 When demand is especially high during
peak transportation hours, riders will see a price increase when they
attempt to summon a TNC.98 Ultimately, surge pricing reduces the overall
demand for rides and, as a result, increases the availability of drivers for
those willing to pay a higher rate.99 The surge pricing also incentivizes
drivers who otherwise would not be working without an increase in pay.100
Therefore, the surge pricing system, which is temporary and lasts only
until demand is back to a normal level, helps ensure that both supply and
demand will remain at consistent levels.101
There are also potential negative externalities posed by the entry of
TNCs into the marketplace. As TNCs enter the marketplace, local
governments are slowly reacting to their presence. Some cities have
outright banned companies such as Uber, whereas others have set up
regulatory schemes that make it infeasible for TNCs to operate under their

97

Id.
Id.
99
Id.
100
McBride, supra note 36, at 48.
101
UBER, supra note 98.
98
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current business model.102 These concerns are discussed in the following
section.
V. HOW TNCS DEAL WITH REGULATION
TNCs are under regulatory pressure to either comply with current
regulations imposed on the taxicab industry, or to cease operations.103 All
TNCs face similar legal concerns, but Uber has faced more opposition
than any other TNC.104
Uber is the only on-demand transportation service that has
ventured outside the United States,105 and has expanded into more cities
than any other company within the U.S.106 Uber is generally very
successful when expanding to new cities.107 As of November 2016, Uber

102

See Ilene Aleshire, City’s Regulations Drive Uber out of town — for now, THE
REGISTER-GUARD (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://projects.registerguard.com/rg/news/local/32941203-75/uber-pulls-out-of-eugeneafter-hearings-official-finds-it-in-violation-of-city-codes.html.csp; see Andy Jechow &
Kylie McGivern, Prop 1 Fails, Marking Defeat for Uber and Lyft in Austin, KXAN
(May 7, 2016, 9:03 PM), http://kxan.com/2016/05/07/prop-1-fails-marking-defeat-foruber-and-lyft-in-austin/.
103
Rayle, supra note 1, at 4.
104
Brown, supra note 7.
105
Natasha Stokes, Uber vs. Via, Lyft & Sidecar: Who's the Best Car Service?,
TECHLICIOUS (Aug. 5, 2015) http://www.techlicious.com/tip/uber-via-lyft-sidecar-bestcar-service/.
106
Id.
107
See generally id.
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operated in 242 cities in the U.S. and 522 cities across the world.108 The
startup giant has enough resources to be able to penetrate into nearly any
market with ease and deal with the aftermath as it comes. Nonetheless,
regulatory and legal concerns, such as passenger safety and local
transportation laws, have made it difficult for Uber to operate.109 In these
situations, Uber tends to fight rather than give in to the demands of its
opponents.110 This creates tension in areas where Uber is not immediately
met with great reception, such as what occurred in Portland, Oregon; and
Austin, Texas, both discussed below.
A.

Problems TNCs Have Faced During Expansion in the U.S.

Uber has participated in legal and regulatory battles throughout the
United States over claims in various legal areas, ranging from price fixing
claims to flaws in its marketing scheme to employment law disputes.111
Lyft, Uber’s greatest ride-hailing rival, was only sued a fraction of the

108

UBER, Uber Cities Across the Globe, https://www.uber.com/cities/ (last visited June
19, 2017).
109
Kristen Brown, Here’s What’s Going on with all of Those Uber Lawsuits, FUSION
(June 16, 2016, 5:18 PM), http://fusion.net/story/315350/uber-class-action-lawsuitsettlement/.
110
Id.
111
See infra Section A.
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amount Uber has been sued.112 A significant amount of the lawsuits
against Uber resulted from Uber’s classification of drivers as independent
contractors.113
In 2014, when TNCs began launching in several cities throughout
the U.S., local governments did not always react positively. 114 Seattle
passed a city ordinance to limit the number of ridesourcing vehicles,
whereas Philadelphia, New York City and Washington D.C. issued
citations

and impounded vehicles.115

The Taxi

and

Limousine

Commission in New York City also issued a temporary restraining order
against Lyft which prevented its initial launch.116 St. Louis, Missouri
issued a temporary restraining order in 2014 as well.117
Uber and its competitor Lyft have seen great difficulty in their
endeavors to expand services specifically to Austin, Texas, due to local
regulations.118 Shortly after Uber entered the Austin market, Austin passed

112

Brown, supra note 7.
See infra Section A.
114
See Rayle, supra note 1, at 4.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See Alicia Inns, et. al, Rideshare Drivers will have to Undergo Fingerprint Checks,
but not Until 2017, KXAN (Dec. 17, 2015, 5:54 AM),
http://kxan.com/2015/12/17/mayor-offers-11th-hour-compromise-to-rideshare113
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a new law that required drivers for companies like Uber to be
fingerprinted in addition to the background checks undergone when
hired.119 In 2015, Austin Mayor Steve Adler announced that TNCs would
have until February 2017 to have their drivers fingerprinted in order to
comply with a city ordinance that requires fingerprinting as a part of
background checks.120 Supporters of the law argued that fingerprinting
would make services like Uber safer for passengers, whereas the
transportation companies see fingerprinting as a barrier to casual drivers
from signing up.121
In May of 2016, Austin voters rejected Proposition 1, a plan to ban
mandatory fingerprinting for two years.122 As a result of the election, both
Uber and Lyft left Austin immediately.123 This left a gap in the supply for

companies/. Uber has also had trouble establishing itself in Portland, Oregon. See
Aleshire, supra note 102. Uber left the city when city officials imposed a $1,500 a day
penalty for non-compliance with local ordinances. Id.
119
Inns et al., supra note 118.
120
Id.
121
See generally id.
122
Phil Prazan & Kate Weidaw, Fingerprints for Uber, Lyft Drivers in the Hands of
Voters, KXAN (Feb. 11, 2016, 8:10 PM), http://kxan.com/2016/02/11/crunch-time-for-acity-council-decision-on-rideshare/. This effectively forced Uber to either comply by
having all 10,000 of its drivers fingerprinted or to cease operations in Austin. See Jechow
& McGivern, supra note 102.
123
Joshua Brustein, Austin’s Mayor Is Keeping Ridesharing Weird, BLOOMBERG
TECHNOLOGY (June 6, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-austinridesharing/.
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on-demand transportation that consumers had grown accustomed to,
which was readily filled by several different platforms.124 Thus, with the
departure of Uber and Lyft came services such as Arcade City, the
antithesis to the safety concern that the fingerprinting was meant to rectify,
and Ride Austin.125
Arcade City is essentially a very large Facebook group that allows
passengers in need of a ride to directly connect with drivers. 126 With over
30,000 members, Arcade City is the biggest forum of its kind, where
members post in the Facebook group asking for or offering rides.127 As it
is, Arcade City is not the most efficient platform to connect passengers
with drivers. Because the group allows anyone to respond to passengers
requests, a driver may call dibs on a passenger but be inconveniently far
away, to the detriment of the passenger.128 The founder of Arcade City,
Christopher David, believes that Arcade City will not have to comply with
the mandatory fingerprinting that ultimately drove Uber and Lyft out of
Austin because Arcade City is merely a platform for drivers and
124

Id.
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See generally id.
125
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passengers to find one another as opposed to companies like Uber that are
regulated by the city. However, David intends to create an app similar in
concept to Uber and Lyft, rendering any distinguishable difference
between Arcade City and Uber moot.129
On the other end of the spectrum of entities rushing to fill the gap
left behind by Uber and Lyft is RideAustin.130 RideAustin is a nonprofit
funded by local investors that have thus far complied with mandatory
fingerprinting.131
In contrast to Uber’s legal confrontation in Austin, Uber saw mild
success when it settled a lawsuit for $10 million in 2016 that was filed by
Los Angeles and San Francisco.132 The suit alleged that by suggesting that
its background checks on drivers were more intensive than those of
taxicab companies, Uber was misleading consumers.133 The main
contention was that taxicab drivers are fingerprinted whereas Uber drivers

129

Id.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Alex Hern, Uber's 'safe ride fee' Becomes 'Booking fee' After $25m Settlement over
rider Safety, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016, 7:36 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/07/uber-driver-background-checklawsuit-passenger-safety-california.
133
Id.
130

309
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/11

28

Parato: Transportation Network Companies'

are not.134 Uber also changed its “Safe Rides Fee” to a “Booking Fee” in
order to lessen the potential for consumer reliance on the safety of its
rides.135 Earlier that year, Uber settled a similar lawsuit brought by
consumers for $28.5 million.136 California also sued Lyft for similar
reasons,137 but rather than contest the charges, Lyft instead settled in 2014
for $250,000.138
What seems to be the most important legal issue for Uber right
now, in addition to its regulatory battles, is whether its drivers are
employees or independent contractors. This issue alone will determine the
outcomes of several lawsuits against Uber.139 The employee-independent
contractor issue has arisen in several suits by Uber drivers claiming that
they are in fact employees of Uber and thus should be reimbursed for

134

Id.
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Ellen Huet, SF, LA District Attorneys Sue Uber, Settle With Lyft Over ‘Misleading’
Business Violations, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2014, 6:44 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/09/sf-la-district-attorneys-sue-uber-andlyft-over-misleading-business-violations/#2c29754ef82f.
139
See Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (explaining that
courts need a determination of whether Uber’s drivers are employees or independent
contractors in order to determine if Uber has not complied with Texas state laws
regarding notification of mass layoffs, for example; see federal employment violation
case).
135
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business expenses and should receive a higher percentage of gratuities
charged to passengers.140
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an employee as “a
person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other's control or right to control.”141 The pertinent factors in
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor are:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the
master may exercise over the details of the work; (b)
whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular
occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for
which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment,
whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the
work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i)
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal
is or is not in business.142

140

See infra Section A.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958) (Am. Law Inst. 2010).
142
Id.
141
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Most recently, the district court denied a preliminary approval of
the proposed $100 million settlement between Uber and its drivers. 143 In
O’Connor v. Uber, the court denied the preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement because the settlement was not “fair, adequate, and
reasonable.”144 The court determined that a close review of the settlement
agreement, even at the preliminary approval stage, was warranted because
new claims and uncertified drivers would be covered by the settlement
agreements, and the settlement agreement would effectively settle several
claims in other pending lawsuits.145 Applicable approval factors that the
court must balance include:
“[T]he strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a government participant; and the reaction of the class
members to the proposed settlement.”146

143

O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *5, *19
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016).
144
Id. at *18.
145
Id. at *8.
146
Id. at *7.
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The court then noted that an important factor in determining
whether the proposed settlement is reasonable or not is the value of the
settlement agreement compared to what the plaintiffs expect to recover.147
This is an ongoing case.
The employee-independent contractor dispute is pertinent in
several other lawsuits.148 Drivers in Texas filed suits against Uber and Lyft
alleging that these companies violated federal labor laws by not giving
proper notice of their departure from Austin.149 This case ultimately
depends on whether drivers for TNCs are classified as employees or
independent contractors.150 Uber customers who were allegedly sexually
assaulted by drivers filed suit against Uber for negligence, fraud, battery,
assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.151 In this case, the court said that in California, “an employer may
be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the

147

Id.
Nolan Hicks, Lawsuits: Uber, Lyft Violated Labor law in Austin Shutdown, MY
STATESMAN (June 9, 2016, 2:52 PM)
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/transportation/lawsuit-uber-lyft-violated-laborlaw-in-austin-shu/nrc8y/.
149
Id.
150
Id. There would have been no violation of federal labor laws if the drivers are
classified as independent contractors. Id.
151
Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
148
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scope of employment.”152 The issue was whether or not drivers were
considered employees; the plaintiffs argued the drivers were employees
and thus Uber was liable for their conduct.153 However, Uber claimed their
drivers were instead independent contractors.154
Uber is also facing legal action for its pricing strategies.155 In
Meyer v. Kalanick, the Southern District of New York denied Uber’s
motion to dismiss an antitrust class action against Travis Kalanick, CEO
of Uber, alleging the CEO engaged in illegal price-fixing in violation of
both federal antitrust law and New York state law.156 Plaintiff’s main
allegations are that Kalanick “conspired with Uber drivers to use Uber's
pricing algorithm to set the prices charged to Uber riders, thereby
restricting price competition among drivers to the detriment of Uber
riders.”157 This case essentially pertains to the validity of Uber’s price
surging during times where demand is especially high. 158 The court noted
that the classification of an individual as an employee or independent

152

Id. at 781.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016).
156
Id. at 820.
157
Id.
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Id. at 821.
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contractor depended on “whether the person to whom service is rendered
has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result
desired.”159 Additionally, the court stated that the § 220 Restatement
(Second) of Agency factors were also relevant.160 Ultimately, the court
held that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to claim an employeeemployer relationship existed.161
B.

Why TNCs Will Succeed Despite Regulatory Pushback

The pertinent issue regarding TNCs is whether legislatures or the
TNCs will shape regulations for TNCs. Currently, the law surrounding
TNCs is being created in the courts, which is not the best way to set policy
because of muddled decisions and variations by jurisdiction.162 Looking at
the negative effects posed by TNCs will help form better policy. 163 Thus,
identifying which stakeholders are harmed by TNCs is just as vital as
identifying who benefits.164

159

Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 781 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting S.G.
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (1989)).
160
Id.
161
Id. at 782.
162
Biber Chen, supra note 79.
163
Id.
164
Id.
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Overall, drivers have both benefitted the most from TNCs and
have been harmed the most. Prior to the addition of TNCs into the market,
drivers’ only options were to lease medallions on a short term basis. Under
this scheme, drivers were independent contractors; they received no
benefits that an employee would as required by law. Drivers worked long
shifts and only earned a fraction of every dollar received from fares.165
With TNCs operating in cities that utilize medallion systems, drivers are
able to drive for both. In particular, Uber allows drivers the flexibility to
make their own work schedule. This allows taxicab drivers, or anyone for
that matter, to offer rides through a TNC while they are not working in
another capacity. Taxicab drivers are not granted this flexibility in
scheduling unless the drivers split the lease among themselves. There are
also costs to drivers as well.166 Drivers are still independent contractors,
and thus still do not receive employee benefits.167
Consumers also benefit from the entry of TNCs. In a survey of 40
economic experts, all 40 either strongly agreed or agreed with the
165

SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 60, at 27.
Tim Worstall, The Economics Of Uber: Who Loses From The Company's Existence?,
FORBES (June 7, 2016, 3:48 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/06/07/the-economics-of-uber-who-losesfrom-the-companys-existence/#41decca91362.
167
Id.
166
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statement that “letting car services such as Uber or Lyft compete with taxi
firms on equal footing regarding genuine safety and insurance
requirements, but without restriction on prices or routes, raises consumer
welfare.”168 Specifically, increased competition improves consumer
welfare.169
Although those who benefit from TNCs benefit greatly, there are
also losers involved. And to make good policy, policy makers should
consider the losers and whether they need protection.170 Taxi medallion
sales have collapsed in what some call the “Uber effect.”171 Not only is the
number of sales declining, but the price of each medallion is as well.172
TNCs have effectively destroyed the medallion system. 173 Prior to the
entry of TNCs, medallion owners could rent out their rights to operate a
taxicab for $40,000 a year.174 The rents from the system went to the

168

Justin Wolfers, Uber Improves Life, Economists Agree, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept.
30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/upshot/uber-improves-life-economistsagree.html?_r=0.
169
Id.
170
Biber Chen, supra note 79.
171
Worstall, supra note 166.
172
Id. In May of 2016, there were just three medallions sales, each bringing in $400,000
to $500,000. Id. In May of 2013, there were eight medallions sold, all for roughly $1
million. Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
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medallion owners; but with the advent of Uber and the like, medallion
owners no longer see such large profits as in prior years.175
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, there are both winners and losers when it comes to
stakeholders involved in TNCs. Overall, consumers seem to benefit the
most. Drivers are both benefitted and harmed, depending on what the
driver wants out of the TNC. For those desiring flexible scheduling, TNCs
are a great option because TNC drivers can work in between other jobs to
supplement their income. But for those looking for higher pay or
employee benefits, TNCs show no benefits.
The biggest losers are those holding taxi medallions. They no
longer have their rent-extracting ability they enjoyed prior to the entry of
TNCs. But, the question is: do consumers care? Consumers were harmed
in the pre-TNCs medallion system, which was a highly regulated,
essentially artificial monopoly where only a few gained almost all the
profit from the industry. TNCs have given consumers what was lacking:
speed, convenience, and easy payment methods, to name a few. From a

175

Id.
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public policy standpoint, the medallion owners hardly seem like a group
that needs regulatory protection.
In addition to future regulations, TNCs, especially Uber, are facing
current litigation on several fronts. This litigation will shape what
becomes the rules TNCs will have to follow. Litigation before regulation
is a bad method of governing TNCs because it leads to inconsistent and
tentative rulings. The rulings are tentative because so much of the pending
litigation depends on the outcome of other pending cases. For example,
many of the lawsuits against Uber hinge on whether drivers are classified
as employees or independent contractors.
In spite of the adversity TNCs face, they will likely stay market
leaders. Their innovations cannot be ignored; now that consumers are able
to utilize a greatly improved transportation service, they are not likely to
let it go away.
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